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Earnings Management: The Role Of  
Accounting Professionals 





In today’s financial markets there is a great deal of pressure for corporations to meet investors’ 
earnings expectations.  Failure to do so may result in the loss of millions of dollars in stock capita-
lization.  As a result, an increasing number of corporate executives have succumbed to the tempta-
tion to “manage” their earnings in order to achieve targeted profits.  The number of companies un-
der investigation by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) for possible accounting fraud 
related to earnings management has increased significantly in recent years.  This article identifies 
and discusses four common areas of potential financial reporting abuse:  restructuring costs, mis-
cellaneous reserve accounts, materiality, and manipulation of revenue recognition.   In addition, 
this paper discusses the vital role of accounting professionals as gatekeepers responsible for help-
ing to maintain the viability of our financial markets. 
 
 
Introduction to the Problem 
 
et income and earnings per share information reported by companies represents some of the most 
important data available to investors.  This bottom line information is particularly significant to 
many readers of financial statements because it has a sense of finality and a ring of truth.  The im-
portance of this statistical information can be witnessed by the fact that a reported earnings per share figure that is a 
few pennies below analysts expectations can result in a dramatic decline in the share price of a company’s stock.  
For start up companies seeking new capitalization or for established mainline companies, the implications of a 5%, 
10%, or even larger drop in stock prices are formidable.    
 
As the result of this pressure, corporate executives may at times feel inclined to manipulate their company’s 
earnings.  Earnings manipulation has been defined as a situation in which a company’s management violates gener-
ally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) in order to favorably represent the company’s financial performance 
(Beneish, 1999).  Because investors tend to prefer companies that demonstrate steady growth, some corporate man-
agers feel compelled to manipulate earnings in order to show steady, continuous, upward growth in their profits. 
 
The role of financial reporting is to provide and communicate information that assists in business decision-
making.   Timely, sufficiently detailed, and high quality information is essential for investors to make sound invest-
ment decisions.  However, according to the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), misleading financial re-
ports are being issued at a startling rate (Schroeder, 2001).  This is evidenced by the fact that a study by the Finan-
cial Executives International group reported that the number of financial restatements issued in the last three years 
was higher than the previous ten years combined (Weil, 2001).  The increased pressure on corporate executives to 
meet investors’ expectations has driven many of them to not only bend the accounting rules to the breaking point, 
but also in some cases to deliberately manipulate reported earnings.  Under increased scrutiny from the SEC regard-
ing the issue of “managed earnings”, these companies have found it necessary to restate previously misleading fi-
nancial statements.  The purpose of this paper is to identify examples of common abuses associated with the delibe-
rate attempt by corporate management to manipulate their earnings report.  In addition, the role that accounting pro-
fessionals, as well as the Securities and Exchange Commission, play in preserving the integrity and  
__________ 
Readers with comments or questions are encouraged to contact the author via e-mail. 
viability of the capital markets in the United States will be examined.   
N 
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Earnings Management  
 
 In 1998, then Chairman of the SEC Arthur Levitt expressed increasing concern that the desire by corpora-
tions to meet investors earnings expectations was resulting in an erosion in the quality of financial reporting (Levitt, 
1998).   He expressed concern that the motivation to achieve consensus earnings estimates prompted many corporate 
managers to engage in earnings manipulation in order to project a pattern of smooth corporate earnings.  Mr. Levitt 
expressed frustration on the part of the SEC regarding areas where integrity in financial reporting was losing out to 
illusion, where gray areas in accounting were being abused for corporate gain, and where corporate earnings reports 
reflect the hopes of management rather than the underlying performance of the company.  There are a number of ap-
proaches corporations have engaged in to manipulate their reported earnings.  The following discussion focuses on 





 Companies regularly assess the efficiency and profitability of their business segments in order to remain 
competitive.  This assessment may result in a decision to restructure the organization.  Expenses associated with re-
structuring are segregated from other expenses on the income statement in order to isolate the impact of nonrecur-
ring items on the net income.  This segregation helps readers of the statements better understand the earnings asso-
ciated with the normal, recurring activities of the business.  However, it has become increasingly common for com-
panies to use what is referred to as the “big bath” strategy with their restructuring charges.  The approach used is to 
combine a large amount of costs that should be properly written off over a number of years and then expense them 
all in one quarter of restructuring.  This is often done in a down quarter that is already fated to disappoint investors.  
The idea is to take a one time big hit to earnings, clean up mistakes of the past, and get the bad news behind the 
company.  Why would a company what to exaggerate these charges?  The argument is that investors are willing to 
look beyond a one time loss and focus on future prospects.  Presumably, the large write-offs then clear the way for 
the company to meet or exceed future earnings expectations.   In addition, if the charges are over estimated and fail 
to fully materialize, they provide a cushion for the future.  For example, in 1997 Heinz overestimated the cost of its 
restructuring by about $25 million.  When it later restated that amount, it did so by directly enhancing the operating 
income of a subsequent year (Sherman and Young, 2001).  This financial reporting is misleading to investors, and 




 Corporate executives keep a constant eye on the market price of their companies stock.  They know that in-
vestors do not like unpleasant earnings surprises, so they are motivated to try to keep net income moving at a steady 
upward trend.  One approach used by some companies is to establish a miscellaneous or special reserve account in 
which unrealistic estimates are used to establish liabilities for such items as bad debts, losses from loans, future war-
ranty costs, and sales returns.  During prosperous periods, companies can exaggerate the expenses associated with 
these items, thus avoiding the difficulty of matching such a high level of net income in succeeding periods.  At the 
same time, excessive reserves are built up that can be drawn upon to offset losses in down years.  Thus, executives 
are able to achieve a smooth upward net income trend by “managing their earnings.” 
 
 Xerox Corporation is an example of a major company that found itself caught up in the questionable prac-
tice of managing earnings.  Xerox recently restated its earnings for the years 1998, 1999, and 2000, and acknowl-
edged that it had misapplied some generally accepted accounting principles  (GAAP) in a number of ways, including 
the improper use of a $100 million reserve used to offset unrelated expenses (Schroeder, 2001).  This apparent abuse 
of financial reporting attracted the attention of the SEC, which is conducting a broad inquiry into its accounting 
practices. 
 
 In another example, the SEC settled civil fraud charges with four executives of Paracelsus Healthcare Cor-
poration.  The SEC alleged that they caused the company to substantially overstate its reported earnings by 9% to 
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303% during the period from 1993 to 1996.  The four executives agreed to pay fines totaling $250,000 in settlement 
of SEC charges that they, among other things, created a $16 million reserve that was used to conceal a decline in 
earnings (Kirchheimer, 2001).  In response to the settlement, the SEC stated that when companies issue misleading 




 The principle of materiality underscores the concept that some financial transactions are so insignificant 
that they are not worth measuring and reporting with exact precision.  For example, some companies may define an 
item as material only if it affects earnings by more than 5% to 10%.  This principle allows for some judgement and 
flexibility in financial reporting.  However, this principle can be misused by companies that seek to do so.  For in-
stance, a company could deliberately manipulate revenues or expenses, and yet do so within an established maxi-
mum percentage of acceptability and claim the misstatement is not material.   
 
In 1999 W.R. Grace & Company settled an earnings manipulation case with the SEC.  The SEC alleged 
that Grace & Company violated generally accepted accounting principles by establishing an all-purpose reserve fund 
to  “smooth” earnings from 1991 to 1995 by hiding profits in good years and using them to disguise slower earnings 
in latter years. Internal company and audit-firm documents revealed that the Big Five accounting firm that audited 
Grace & Company discovered the buildup of earnings in the early 1990s and repeatedly warned company executives 
that what they were doing was improper.  However, even after Grace & Company began shifting money into earn-
ings in 1993 and 1994, the outside auditors continued to give the company a favorable audit opinion on their finan-
cial statements.  The accounting firm based their decision on the grounds that it did not view the improprieties as 
“material” (Davis, 1999).    
 
The argument that the impact of distortions leading to a smoothing of earnings is too small to matter brings 
into question the motive of why a company would work so hard to bring this about.  In today’s markets, missing an 
earnings projection by a few cents can lead to the loss of millions of dollars in the market value of a company’s se-
curities.  The SEC clearly viewed the distortions by Grace & Company as material and therefore as a violation of 
generally accepted accounting principles, as well as a violation of securities laws.  As part of the settlement with the 
SEC, Grace agreed to pay one million dollars to establish a public education program to promote better financial re-
porting and greater adherence to generally accepted accounting principles (Nielsen, 1999). 
 
Improper Revenue Recognition 
 
 Revenue is generally deemed to be earned and therefore recognized when a product has been shipped or re-
ceived by the customer, or when a service has been rendered.  In most cases this determination is relatively simple.  
However, for some companies identifying the exact point in time that revenue is earned requires judgment.  Once 
again, ambiguities in the rules open the door for manipulation of earnings by corporate executives determined to do 
so.  Some companies manipulate their earnings by recognizing revenue before a sale is complete, before a product is 
delivered to the customer, or at a point in time when the customer still has the option to cancel or delay the sale (Le-
vitt, 1998). 
 
 In March 2000, MicroStrategy announced that it was changing its revenue recognition policies, and as a re-
sult it was restating its 1998 and 1999 reported earnings.  The company sold software bundled with multiyear con-
sulting contracts to its customers.  However, rather than recognizing the revenue from the sale of the software over 
the life of the contracts, MicroStrategy recorded it immediately.  MicroStrategy decided to change their revenue rec-
ognition policy after the SEC began to question the propriety of such tactics among software companies.  This 
change in policy resulted in a change in reported profits of $12.6 million into a reported loss in excess of $34 mil-
lion.  The financial impact was immediate and dramatic.  MicroStrategy’s stock price collapsed 62% in a single day, 
wiping out $12 billion in market value ((Sherman and Young, 2001).  Ultimately it is the stockholders who are hurt 
by questionable revenue recognition policies.  As a result, the SEC filed a case against MicroStrategy charging them 
with premature recognition of revenue resulting in incorrect financial statements.  That investigation lead to a set-
tlement of fraud charges and $10 million in fines against several of the company’s top executives (Hunt, 2001).                   
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The Role of Accounting Professionals 
 
 The importance of reliable, efficient, and trustworthy financial markets as a means of providing capital 
formation can hardly be overstated.  Financial markets in other parts of the world have learned the agonizing lesson 
that if investors are not provided with adequate, informative, and reliable information then the bonds of trust be-
tween shareholders and the corporation will be broken.  The results are that investors lose confidence in the system, 
and the financial markets forfeit their role as a stable force in the formation of capital.   
 
 Today, the United States capital markets are clearly among the best in the world.  This is due in no small 
part to the confidence that investors have in the system of financial reporting that exist in the U.S.  The rules and 
regulations that have evolved over time have been designed to provide for timely, reliable, comparable, and transpa-
rent financial statements.  Accounting standards exists as the result of efforts to “standardize”, and thus make com-
parable, the financial reporting of companies.  However, recognizing that it is not possible to anticipate every new 
type of business organization or innovative type of business transaction, the accounting profession developed prin-
ciples that allow for flexibility in order to adapt to changing business environments.  As a result, judgements requir-
ing subjectivity and discretion are often required in the application of generally accepted accounting principles 
(GAAP).  This flexibility in the reporting standards creates an opportunity for individuals so inclined to manipulate 
the reported earnings of a company.  For that reason, it is of the utmost importance that members of the accounting 
profession maintain the highest standards of objectivity and integrity in the performance of their duties.   
 
 The accounting profession in the United States has always had a tradition and reputation for conducting it-
self in a manner consistent with the highest of ethical standards.  However, in recent years questions have arisen 
concerning the role that accountants play in the inappropriate “management” of corporate earnings. While the pres-
entation of a company’s financial statements is the responsibility of top management, the actual preparation of the 
financial statements is the responsibility of members of the accounting profession.  Since 1998 there has been a 28% 
increase in the number of accounting-related cases brought by the SEC.  In the year 2000 alone, SEC regulators is-
sued 100 financial-fraud actions against U.S. companies (Schroeder, 2001).  In each case of financial fraud or re-
porting failure, the SEC wants to know where were the accountants and what role did they play?   All too often in 
these cases, company accountants or outside auditors either turned a blind eye to the problem or were directly in-
volved in the scheme.  In fact, in the year 2000, investigations into financial fraud or reporting failures resulted in 
the SEC barring 26 corporate CPAs and 11 outside audit professionals from doing work for public companies that 
fall under the jurisdiction of the SEC (Hunt, 2001)            
 
Of increasing concern to the SEC are the potential conflicts of interest that may arise when accounting 
firms provide both audit and non-audit services to the same company (Weil, 2001).  The SEC cited a recent land-
mark fraud settlement with the Big Five accounting firm of Arthur Andersen in which it agreed to pay a $7 million 
fine to settle charges that it filed false and misleading audit reports of its client Waste Management.  Waste Man-
agement admitted that it had overstated its pretax earnings by more than $1 billion from 1992 to 1996.  The SEC has 
expressed concern that Arthur Andersen ignored blatant violations of accounting principles due in part to the con-
flicts of interest caused by the fact that Waste Management was a major client and source of revenue from consult-
ing and non-audit services. 
 
 Accountants often face a variety of pressures in their jobs.  As discussed earlier, in order to enhance stock 
values corporate management would generally prefer to report a smooth upward trend in earnings rather than report 
a widely fluctuating earnings pattern.  Nevertheless, accountants should always resist pressure to deliberately 
smooth or “manage” earnings.  They should always refuse to engage in unethical reporting practices such as shifting 
revenues and expenses between periods, inappropriately capitalizing costs that should be expensed, or misclassify-
ing product and period costs.    
 
 Sometimes the correct ethical choices are obvious and clear-cut.  But many times the correct ethical thing 
to do is much more ambiguous, and often the pressure to select the less ethical but more expedient course of action 
may be enormous.  Professional accounting organizations such as the American Institute of CPAs (AICPA) and the 
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Institute of Management Accountants (IMA) have established standards of ethical conduct for their members.  The 
established codes of conduct provide standards that co-workers, customers, clients, shareholders, and the general 
public can expect of members of the accounting profession.  In addition, the codes of conduct provide accountants 
with an acknowledged set of standards that they can draw upon when faced with an ethical dilemma.  For example, 
when confronted by others to engage in an unethical or questionable act, the accounting professional can point to the 
professional code of ethics as the guiding reference to his actions in those matters.  Accounting professionals have 
an obligation to shareholders, the general public, their profession, the organizations they work for, as well as to 
themselves to at all times to uphold the highest standards of ethical behavior.          
 
The Role of the Securities and Exchange Commission 
 
 The principal responsibility of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) is to protect investors and 
to maintain the integrity of the financial markets.  The Federal Securities Act of 1933 provided the SEC with the au-
thority to regulate the initial public offerings of a company’s securities in order to protect investors from fraud.  The 
Securities Act of 1934 provided the SEC with authority to regulate subsequent trading of securities.  In addition, it 
provided the SEC with the authority to prescribe accounting principles and reporting practices of publicly traded 
companies.  Both acts were passed by Congress in order to help prevent accounting and financial reporting abuses.   
 
 Violation of federal securities laws are subject to investigation by the SEC Division of Enforcement.  The 
number of companies under investigation for possible accounting fraud has increased significantly in recent years to 
nearly 260 (Schroeder, 2001).  This is due in large part to what the SEC refers to as an increase in the number of in-
stances of “abusive earnings management” by publicly traded companies.  As discussed above, earnings manage-
ment can be achieved by improper accounting for restructuring costs, improper use of miscellaneous reserves, im-
proper application of the materiality concept, and premature recognition of revenue.  Each of these methods can be 
used to “manage” the timing of revenue and expense recognition, thus enabling companies to meet their projected 
earnings estimates.  In response to the use of these abusive practices by an increasingly large number of companies, 
the SEC has proposed new regulations to deal with the problem (Stanko, 2001).  The proposed “Supplemental Fi-
nancial Information” legislation is designed to improve clarity of financial reporting by requiring greater disclosure 
of certain procedures and the underlying accounting assumptions that are made by management in order to justify 
these procedures.   
 
 The SEC also has statutory authority to impose penalties on companies that are in noncompliance with SEC 
regulations.  The SEC's Division of Enforcement has increased its investigation of cases involving financial fraud, 
especially in the area of inappropriate earnings management.  It has created a special Financial Fraud Task Force 
that is focusing on companies whose financial statements reflect an inappropriate managing of earnings or other ap-
parent violations of generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP).  These expanded investigations now include 
audit work performed by outside accounting firms.  The SEC has made clear that it has stepped up its scrutiny of 
outside auditing firms for failing to prevent and disclose such manipulation by their clients.  The SEC has demon-
strated its determination to aggressively use all legal remedies, such as substantial fines and the barring of profes-
sionals from doing accounting work for publicly traded companies, in order to insure compliance with SEC regula-




 In recent years, the SEC has expressed a growing concern over the quality of the financial statements of 
publicly traded companies.  When actual results from operations fail to produce the desired income, a significant and 
increasing number of companies have demonstrated their willingness to manipulate earnings in order to achieve 
short-term investor expectations.  To often, the result is that investors end up losing hundreds of millions of dollars 
in stock valuations.  For example, the 2000 restatement of earnings by MicroStrategy Inc. resulted in a three-day de-
cline in shareholder value of $11.9 billion (Weil, 2001).   
 
 In large measure, the success of our globalized economy is dependent upon the reliability of the U.S. finan-
cial markets. Financial markets exits through the faith of investors.  The United States financial markets currently 
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benefit from the confidence of investors around the globe.  But how much accounting manipulation and misleading 
financial disclosures will it take to undermine the faith that people have in our markets?  Members of the accounting 
profession must never lose sight of their responsibility to the investing public.  Nothing less than the viability of our 
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